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PRESERVING PRESERVATION: LONG GREEN VALLEY 
ASSOCIATION, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, AND 




Across the United States, landowners have preserved 19.8 million 
acres of farmland, forest, and wetlands through legal instruments known as 
conservation easements.
1
  In a perpetual conservation easement, a landown-
er voluntarily restricts the uses of his land in perpetuity to serve a conserva-
tion purpose, binding future owners of the land to the restrictions set forth 
in the easement deed.
2
  The land mass protected by these instruments is 
sizeable—roughly the size of South Carolina3 and nearly one-quarter the 
size of the National Park System
4—and those charged with its preservation 
face the threat of legal challenges in the years to come.
5
  Conservation 
easements came into wide use in the 1980s as a means for landowners to 
preserve their land while maintaining private ownership.
6
  Currently, land 
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 1.  See NCED at a Glance, NAT’L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, 
http://www.conservationeasement.us (last updated Sept. 2013).  The total amount of preserved 
land in the country, including land preserved by conservation easements as well as fee simple 
ownership by conservation organizations, is estimated at 47 million acres.  Land Trust Alliance, 
Land Trust Alliance Census Survey, SAVING LAND, Winter 2012, at 34.  
 2.  See, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986) (explain-
ing the mechanism of conservation easements and providing standard easement terms). 
 3.  State & County QuickFacts: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2013). 
 4.  NAT’L PARK SERVICE, THE NATIONAL PARKS: INDEX 2009–2011, 6 (2009), 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/nps/index2009_11.pdf. 
 5.  C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25, 26 
(2008). 
 6.  See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 676–77 (2007) (“Perpetual conservation easements encumbering land were 
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encumbered by the first wave of these easements is rapidly changing hands 
from the original conservation-minded easement donors to new owners.
7
  
Because the easement terms limit future residential and commercial devel-
opment and, thus, landowners’ ability to utilize their property, successor 
owners are much more likely to institute lawsuits to contest these terms.
8
 
Some have argued that to protect these conservation easements in per-
petuity, courts should apply charitable trust doctrine.
9
  In a charitable trust, 
legal and beneficial title is split, and the landowner holds the legal title for 
the benefit of the general public.
10
  If conservation easements were con-
strued as creating charitable trusts, the easement could not be substantially 
modified without a court proceeding to ensure the new terms comport with 
the easement donor’s purpose.11  Many argue that this approach would se-
cure the easements against legal challenges, as successor landowners could 
not simply modify the easement terms to permit the development they de-
sire.
12
  Additionally, construing the easement as a charitable trust confers 
standing on the state attorney general, and potentially on other interested 
parties,
13
 to enter into the legal proceedings and defend the charitable trust, 
which commentators note could be an additional tool to protect the conser-
vation purpose of these easements.
14
 
The question of who has standing to enforce these conservation ease-
ments is likely to be a central inquiry in conservation law in the coming 
years.  Application of charitable trust doctrine and standing affects the en-
forcement of the restrictions on the nearly twenty million acres already un-
                                                          
not used on a widespread basis until the mid-1980s and courts are only now beginning to hear cas-
es involving their substantial modification or termination.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 7.  Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 26. 
 8.  Id.  Since conservation easements travel with the title to the property, their restrictions 
bind not only the landowner who conveys the easement, but all subsequent owners as well.  Vill. 
of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986). 
 9.  See McLaughlin, supra note 6 (arguing that charitable trust doctrine “ensure[s] that the 
public interest and considerable investment in perpetual conservation easements is appropriately 
protected”).  
 10.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259, 266 (Ariz. 1966) (“Though the 
legal title had vested in the Board of Directors, the equitable title remained with those of the pub-
lic to be benefitted.”). 
 11.  In re Lucas Charitable Gift, 261 P.3d 800, 809 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011). 
 12.  Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control over 
the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 123–24 (2003). 
 13.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) (“A suit can be maintained for the 
enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General . . . or by a person who has a special 
interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no special inter-
est.”). 
 14.  See Arpad, supra note 12, at 143–44 (noting that in a charitable trust case, the attorney 
general could enforce the easement even if the state easement statute and easement deed do not 
provide for third-party enforcement). 
  
988 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:986 
der easement
15
 as well as future landowners’ willingness to convey conser-
vation easements.
16
  While expanded standing may strengthen enforcement 
of existing easements, it may have a deterrent effect on the creation of fu-
ture easements.
17
  Landowners are less likely to convey an easement they 
think will result in costly litigation.  The Maryland Court of Appeals, in 
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc.18 (“LGVA”), recently ad-
dressed the issues of conservation easements, the application of charitable 
trust doctrine, and third-party standing, finding that there was no charitable 
trust, and the plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to enforce the easement.
19
  
This Comment examines LGVA in the context of case law pertaining to 
conservation easements and charitable trusts.
20
  This Comment concludes 
that charitable trust doctrine is beneficial to securing the future of conserva-
tion easements
21
 but suggests that third-party standing should be construed 
narrowly in order to comport with landowners’ expectations.22 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Conservation easements undoubtedly provide an environmental, sce-
nic, or cultural benefit to the public, and may thus be characterized as 
“charitable.”23  It is a separate inquiry, however, whether the landowner 
who conveyed the easement intended to impose equitable duties on himself 
to manage the property for the benefit of the public, thereby creating a char-
itable trust.
24
  Maryland courts have twice addressed the question of wheth-
er a conservation easement creates a charitable trust, most recently in 
LGVA.
25
  The related question of who has standing to enforce a charitable 




This Part first provides a basic background on conservation easements 
and charitable trusts.
27
  Second, it highlights examples of the application of 
                                                          
 15.  See NCED at a Glance, supra note 1. 
 16.  See infra Part II.C. 
 17.  See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66 (arguing that charitable trust doctrine complicates 
conservation easement enforcement by increasing the number of parties involved in litigation). 
 18.  432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013). 
 19.  Id. at 313–24, 68 A.3d at 855–62. 
 20.  See infra Part I.D. 
 21.  See infra Part II.A. 
 22.  See infra Part II.C. 
 23.  See infra Part I.A. 
 24.  See infra Part I.C. 
 25.  See infra Part I.D. 
 26.  See infra Part I.E. 
 27.  See infra Parts I.A–B. 
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charitable trust law to conservation easements
28
 before detailing the two 
Maryland cases that address this issue.
29
  Lastly, it examines standing to en-




A. Conservation Easements 
A conservation easement is a legal agreement between a landowner 
and a grantee organization, usually a nonprofit land trust or a government 
agency, that restricts potential uses of the land.
31
  Conservation easements 
generally limit residential and commercial development but may permit ag-
ricultural uses.
32
  In exchange for devaluing the property by limiting the al-
lowable uses, a landowner may be paid directly
33
 or receive income, proper-
ty, or estate tax benefits.
34
  With some exceptions, conservation easements 
are generally perpetual,
35
 and the deed of easement passes along with the 
land to subsequent landowners, binding them to the easement’s re-
strictions.
36
  Although conservation easements provide a number of benefits 
to the public—open space, air and water quality, and scenic views, for ex-
ample
37—most conservation easements make no provisions for public ac-
cess.
38
  Easement deeds generally provide for their enforcement, allowing 
the grantee land trust to seek judicial enforcement to ensure the landowner 
complies with the easement terms.
39
 
                                                          
 28.  See infra Part I.C. 
 29.  See infra Part I.D. 
 30.  See infra Part I.E. 
 31.  Md. Envtl. Trust v. Gaynor, 370 Md. 89, 91, 803 A.2d 512, 513 n.1 (2002).  A “land 
trust” is a commonly used term for an entity, usually a nonprofit organization or government 
agency, that accepts, monitors, and enforces conservation easements.  See id. at 92–93, 803 A.2d 
at 513–14 (considering a conveyance to a government-affiliated land trust). 
 32.  See, e.g., Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 52–53, 985 A.2d 565, 
569–70 (2009) (detailing the uses permitted by an agricultural easement). 
 33.  See, e.g., id., 985 A.2d at 569 (noting that the landowner received $262,190.50 for the 
conveyance of the easement). 
 34.  Gaynor, 370 Md. at 91, 803 A.2d at 513 n.1. 
 35.  See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 302, 68 A.3d 
843, 848 (2013) (stating that the easement was to be “in perpetuity, or for so long as profitable 
farming is feasible”).  
 36.  See, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Bolger Found., 517 A.2d 135, 136 (N.J. 1986) (noting the 
easement was binding on the current landowners as well as their “successors and assigns”).  
 37.  See, e.g., Hicks v. Dowd,157 P.3d 914, 916 (stating the purpose of a land trust was to 
preserve the area’s “scenic resources,” defined as “all attributes of the landscape from which visu-
ally defined values arise including but not limited to topography, rock outcrops, vegetation, lakes 
and streams, panoramic view, and wildlife.”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 299, 68 A.3d at 847 (noting that the 
easement “does not grant the public a right of access or a right of use” to the preserved property). 
 39.  Id.   
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B.  Charitable Trusts 
A charitable trust is defined as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to 
property arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, 
and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties 
to deal with the property for a charitable purpose.”40  In a charitable trust, 
legal and beneficial title is split, and the owner of the trust property (the 




A valid charitable trust has five elements: (1) a fiduciary relationship, 
(2) duties of trustees, (3) trust property, (4) the settlor’s manifestation of in-
tention to create a trust, and (5) a charitable purpose.
42
  In the conservation 
easement context, the fourth and fifth elements are the most likely to be 
contested.
43
  To determine charitable purpose, the settlor must manifest the 
intent to impose equitable duties to deal with the property for another’s 
benefit.
44
  The writing that establishes the trust need not say explicitly that it 
is a trust, or that its purpose is charitable, so long as the settlor demonstrates 
charitable intent.
45
  Conversely, grantor intent is the hallmark of trust inter-
pretation, and a charitable trust will not be found if the grantor did not in-
tend to benefit others in a charitable manner.
46
  The charitable purpose 
prong is very broad, encompassing the relief of poverty, advancement of 
education, advancement of religion, promotion of health, governmental or 
municipal purposes, or other purposes beneficial to the community.
47
 
                                                          
 40.  Rosser v. Prem, 52 Md. App. 367, 374, 449 A.2d 461, 465 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959)). 
 41.  Burrier v. Jones, 92 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. 1936) (en banc).  Charitable trusts have a 
strong history of enforcement in the United States, with the Supreme Court in 1819 rooting the 
trustee’s duties to comply with the trust instrument in the Constitution’s contract clause.  Trustees 
of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 649–50 (1819) (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1).  In that case, the Court reasoned that because the contract clause prohibits the states 
from interfering with contracts, the New Hampshire state legislature could not alter Dartmouth 
College’s charter of incorporation in contravention of the trust settlor’s intention.  Id. 
 42.  Rosser, 52 Md. App. at 377–78, 449 A.2d at 467 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 348 (1959)). 
 43.  See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 318–24, 68 A.3d at 858–62 (examining 
whether the easement grantor had intent to create a trust and whether the easement’s purpose was 
charitable). 
 44.  S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health v. McMaster, 642 S.E.2d 552, 555 (S.C. 2007) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 24 (1959)). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc. v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 370 
Md. 152, 182, 803 A.2d 548, 566–67 (2002). 
 47.  Rosser, 52 Md. App. at 374, 449 A.2d at 465 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 368 (1959)).  The breadth of uses qualifying as charitable was demonstrated in Rosser, 
where a testator had written a quasi-religious manuscript about her experience mourning her 
daughter and provided for the book’s publishing and distribution in her will.  Id. at 368–70, 449 
A.2d at 462–63.  Although the book was described as “ungodly bad” and having “no ready-made 
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A key aspect of charitable trusts is that the charitable purpose cannot 
be modified without court approval.
48
  In this court proceeding, known as cy 
pres, a court may impose a substitute purpose as near as the original chari-
table purpose as possible.
49
  Cy pres is only appropriate if the original pur-
pose for the gift has become impossible or impracticable—for example, a 
bequest to fund scholarships to a specific university that later goes bank-
rupt.
50
  As conservation easements can be modified without court approval 
outside of the charitable trust context,
51
 a court finding that a trust purpose 
cannot be modified without a court proceeding is often tantamount to find-
ing a charitable trust.
52
 
C.  Case Law on Conservation Easements and Charitable Trusts 
Case law applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements 
is generally sparse, giving even more import to a fully adjudicated case 
such as LGVA.
53
  Analogous cases involving conveyances of land for public 
use, however, have helped develop the charitable trust doctrine.
54
  In Balti-
                                                          
audience,” the court held that the testator’s subjective charitable intent was manifested in the text 
of the deed, the manuscript had the possibility of helping people in similar situations to the author, 
and thus a charitable trust had been created.  Id. at 370–71, 385–86, 449 A.2d at 463, 471. 
 48.  See, e.g., Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2007) (using cy pres 
to modify a charitable trust for a memorial garden after the garden area was slated for develop-
ment).   
 49.  Id. at 553.  Cy pres has three requirements: the existence of a charitable trust, the trust’s 
impracticability, and a general charitable purpose by the donor.  Id. at 555.  In Kolb, for example, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa found that although the original location of the garden was important 
to the settlors, the primary purpose of the trust was to memorialize their family member and bene-
fit the city.  Id. at 559–60.  Cy pres thus permitted the court to choose an alternate location for the 
garden.  Id.  
 50.  See Simmons v. Parsons Coll., 256 N.W.2d 225, 226–28 (Iowa 1977) (finding that alt-
hough the original purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill, cy pres did not apply be-
cause the testator had provided for alternative disposition of the funds).  The theory underlying cy 
pres is that a charitable institution is merely the “agent for effectuating” the charitable gift.  In re 
Coleman’s Estate, 584 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).  Thus, if the gift becomes impracti-
cable, the court must seek another agent to accept the gift and effectuate the settlor’s charitable 
intent.  Id. 
 51.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118(d) (West 2013) (providing that conserva-
tion easements, like other easements, can be extinguished by mutual agreement of the grantor and 
grantee). 
 52.  See Kolb, 736 N.W.2d at 560 (holding the gift created a charitable trust and approving a 
proposed use under cy pres). 
 53.  See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 296, 68 A.3d 843, 
845 (2013) (stating that the question of whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust 
is a “question of first impression” for the Maryland Court of Appeals).  
 54.  See, e.g., Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 
1025–26 (Haw. 1988) (concluding that a conveyance of land for use as a public park created a 
charitable trust). 
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more v. Peabody Institute,
55
 for example, a man left property to the City of 
Baltimore in his will with the designation that the property be sold and the 
proceeds applied to create “The Leakin Park.”56  The city proposed to build 
several smaller neighborhood playgrounds instead, and the testator’s sister 
sued, alleging the plan was contrary to her brother’s intent.57  The city ar-
gued that it was able to accept any charitable gift for any use within its cor-
porate powers.
58
 The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that 
when a municipality holds a property in trust, the court will prevent misap-
plication of the trust funds.
59
  Concluding that the will had created a chari-
table trust and that the establishment of several playgrounds was contrary to 
the donor’s intent to create one park, the court compelled the city either to 




Similarly, in In re Village of Mount Prospect,
61
 a subdivision develop-
er was required by a local ordinance to dedicate a lot “for public purposes” 
with no other restrictions.
62
  The village then passed an ordinance stating 
the property no longer served a public use and requested the trial court ap-
ply cy pres to sell the property and use the proceeds for another public pur-
pose.
63
  The Illinois Appellate Court disagreed, finding the grantor’s chari-
table purpose in the designation on the subdivision plat reading “for public 
purposes”64 and declaring that “[w]hen land is dedicated for public usage, 
the municipality becomes the trustee for the benefit of the public.”65  Thus, 
the court concluded that the developer’s designation of the land for public 
use (although required by law) created a charitable trust, but that cy pres 




Although there are many similarities between the transactions, conser-
vation easements differ from the fee simple conveyances in Peabody and 
Mount Prospect in several ways.  With conservation easements, the public 
is likely not permitted to access the property, so the public benefit may be 
                                                          
 55.  Mayor of Balt. v. Peabody Inst. of Balt., 175 Md. 186, 200 A. 375 (1938). 
 56.  Id. at 188–89, 200 A. at 376. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 190, 200 A. at 377. 
 59.  Id. at 192, 200 A. at 378. 
 60.  Id. at 193, 200 A. at 378. 
 61.  522 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 62.  Id. at 124.  The village used the property for access to a drainage ditch and left it vacant 
except for shrubs.  Id. at 124–25.  
 63.  Id. at 124. 
 64.  Id. at 126. 
 65.  Id. at 125. 
 66.  Id. at 126. 
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less clear than when the property is transferred in fee.
67
  Additionally, the 
property encumbered by the easement likely remains in private ownership, 
and, as a result, the grantee organization does not retain an economic as-
set.
68
  In the conservation easement context, therefore, the connection be-
tween the conveyance and the creation of a charitable trust is weaker than in 
fee simple conveyances for public use.
69
 
Courts across the country have taken different approaches to consider-
ing whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust.  In Tennes-
see Environmental Council v. Bright Par 3 Associates,
70
 a Chattanooga de-
veloper conveyed a perpetual easement to a nonprofit land trust on 
approximately eight acres of woodlands.
71
  The easement declared that the 
property possessed “scenic, open space, and recreational values of great im-
portance to the people of the city and the state of Tennessee.”72  The ease-
ment granted rights to the developer to access an adjacent property he 
owned, but prohibited construction and contained a catch-all provision pro-
hibiting any activity that would “significantly impair or interfere with its 
conservation values.”73  When the adjacent property was developed as a 
Wal-Mart, the developer built a four-lane access road across the property, 
kicking off a firestorm of controversy.
74
  The parties eventually settled the 
dispute, with the developers transferring both an equivalent amount of land 
and $500,000 to the plaintiffs for conservation purposes.
75
  In the settlement 
order, the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, Tennessee, noted that the 
conservation easement was a “charitable gift” within the charitable benefi-
ciaries statute and described a cy pres process to change the easement 
                                                          
 67.  See, e.g., Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690, 698 (Me. 2009) (noting that 
the encumbered land was only to be used for “residential recreational purposes, and maintenance 
or access related to such purposes”). 
 68.  While the grantee organization “holds” the easements, they are not generally counted as 
economic assets because the land trust is not in a position to exercise the development rights ex-
tinguished by the easement.  See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 
636, 653, 46 A.3d 473, 483 n.7 (2012) (noting that conservation easements involve payment for 
the “termination or extinguishment” of property rights), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013). 
 69.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001, 5 (2012) (finding the conserva-
tion easement in question did not create a charitable trust).  
 70.  No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 419720, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 8, 
2004).  This unpublished opinion is from the initial lawsuit concerning the plaintiff’s standing.  Id.  
The subsequent lawsuit on the merits of the case settled and thus did not result in a published 
court opinion.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 698.   
 71.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 695. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 697. 
 75.  Id. at 698. 
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terms, underscoring the view that conservation easements are charitable 
trusts that cannot be modified without court approval.
76
 
Not all courts, however, agree that conservation easements create char-
itable trusts. In Carpenter v. Commissioner,
77
 the United States Tax Court 
looked to the easement deed to determine whether the grantor manifested an 
intention to create a charitable trust.
78
  The court considered the easement’s 
stated purposes, which included “assur[ing] that the [p]roperty will be re-
turned to and retained forever predominantly in a natural, scenic, and open 
space condition.”79  The court concluded that the grantors did not intend to 
donate the easement “with a general charitable purpose.”80  Because the 
deed manifested no such intention, the court concluded that a charitable 
trust was not created, and the parties were free to mutually agree to extin-
guish the easement.
81
  Although the idea that conservation easements create 
charitable trusts has gained some traction in courts in recent years, it is far 
from a settled matter.
82
 
D.  Conservation Easements and Charitable Trusts in Maryland 
In an area of law with very little court precedent, Maryland has a 
unique juxtaposition of two cases, Attorney General of Maryland v. Miller 
(known as the “Myrtle Grove” case)83 and LGVA, both of which considered 
                                                          
 76.  Id. at 698, 700.  A similar case was presented in In re Preservation Alliance of Philadel-
phia, where the owner of a historic house in Philadelphia donated an easement to preserve the fa-
çade of the house. Id. at 693.  After the easement conveyance, the house became dilapidated; and 
the Preservation Alliance petitioned the court to use cy pres to extinguish the façade easement, 
replace it with covenants preserving the site as a park, and require any future building to comply 
with the historic character of the area.  Id. at 694.  The court determined that the easement was a 
“charitable interest,” but the house had become so dilapidated that the charitable purpose had been 
frustrated.  Id.  The court thus extinguished the easement and instituted the covenants sought by 
the Preservation Alliance.  Id.  Preservation Alliance presents the first time a court has authorized 
the extinguishment of a perpetual easement, but demonstrates the charitable trust principle that the 
parties are not free to simply extinguish an easement by private agreement.  Id. 
 77.  T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001 (2012).  Here, the United States Tax Court applied Colorado 
law, where the highest appellate court in Colorado had not decided whether easements constitute 
charitable trusts.  Id. at 5. 
 78.  Id. at 5–6.  
 79.  Id. at 7. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 712 (“It is hoped that the application of charitable trust 
principles to perpetual conservation easements will soon be confirmed.”). 
 83.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Miller, No. 20-C-98-003486 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 9, 1998).  In the absence of a published court opinion, the facts and proceedings 
of the Myrtle Grove case are best summarized in Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual 
Conservation Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1031 (2006). 
  
2014] PRESERVING PRESERVATION 995 
the question of whether a conservation easement creates a charitable trust.
84
  
The Maryland Attorney General was involved in both cases
85
 and argued 
seemingly opposing positions: in Myrtle Grove that a charitable trust had 
been created
86
 and in LGVA that no trust had been created.
87
 
1.  The Myrtle Grove Case 
In the Myrtle Grove case, Margaret Donoho donated a perpetual con-
servation easement on a 160-acre historic tobacco plantation on Maryland’s 
Eastern Shore to the National Trust for Historic Preservation (“the National 
Trust”), a nonprofit land trust.88  Mrs. Donoho’s donation aimed to preserve 
the “historic, architectural, cultural and scenic values of said land and the 
improvements thereon for the continuing benefit of the people of the State 
of Maryland and the United States of America” and to prohibit activities 
such as subdivision and further construction.
89
  After Mrs. Donoho died, the 
property was sold to a private trust established by a Washington, D.C. de-
veloper (“the Miller Trust”).90  Representatives of the Miller Trust, contend-
ing that they were under significant financial burden to maintain the historic 
buildings, petitioned to limit the easement to a 47-acre “historic core” of the 
property and allow the subdivision of the property into six additional resi-
dential lots.
91
  The National Trust voted to permit the amendment, arguing 
that it was an “opportunity to strengthen the easement by imposing affirma-
tive obligations” to maintain the historic buildings and grounds.92 
The National Trust’s decision was highly contentious.93  After public 
outcry, the National Trust reconsidered its position and withdrew its ap-
                                                          
 84.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 297, 68 A.3d 843, 845 
(2013); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 85.  The Maryland Attorney General intervened in Myrtle Grove as the overseer of charitable 
trusts, and represented the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, a state agency, in 
LGVA.  Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondent Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation at 1, Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 
(2013) (No. 65); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 7. 
 86.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 1, 6–7. 
 87.  Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondents, supra note 85, at 22. 
 88.  McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1041.  The property contained several historic buildings, 
including the oldest law office in the United States.  Id. at 1042. 
 89.  Id. at 1043.  The conservation easement made no provisions for later amendment.  Id. at 
1044. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. at 1046–47. 
 92.  Id. at 1049. 
 93.  Id. at 1050.  Mrs. Donoho’s daughter wrote in a letter to the National Trust that the dis-
tinction between the “historic core” and the rest of the property “would have made no sense” to 
Mrs. Donoho and pointed out that if Mrs. Donoho had wanted to preserve only the buildings, she 
could have sold off the surrounding farmland and “thus insured herself a much easier old age than 
she had.”  Id. at 1050–51. 
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proval of the amendment, noting that the conservation easement clearly 
prohibited further subdivision of the property.
94
  The Miller Trust then sued 
the National Trust for breach of contract, seeking specific performance of 
the amendment.
95
  The National Trust contended that the easement created a 




The Maryland Attorney General then filed a collateral suit against the 
Miller Trust,
97
 arguing that the easement was “not a mere conservation 
agreement but a gift in perpetuity to a charitable corporation for the benefit 
of the people of Maryland” and as such was “subject to a charitable trust.”98  
Although the Maryland conservation easement enabling statute permitted 
conservation easements to be amended by mutual agreement of the par-
ties,
99
 the Attorney General argued that the statute did not intend to “abro-
gate application of well-settled charitable principles when a conservation 
easement is gifted to a charitable corporation.”100  Arguing that the conser-
vation easement and extrinsic evidence manifested the requisite charitable 
intent to create a charitable trust, the Attorney General concluded that be-
cause the easement’s purpose had not become impracticable, the easement 
could not be amended in a cy pres proceeding.
101
 
The Myrtle Grove case settled in 1998; the National Trust agreed to 
pay the Miller Trust $225,000, and both parties agreed that subdivision of 
the property was prohibited.  Moreover, the consent decree stipulated that 
the easement could not be amended “without the express written consent of 
the Attorney General of Maryland.”102  Although the case did not result in a 
court opinion, the trial court’s agreement to the settlement terms was inter-




2. Long Green Valley Association v. Bellevale Farms, Inc. 
A decade after the Myrtle Grove case, a similar case made its way to 
the highest court in Maryland.  In LGVA, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
                                                          
 94.  Id. at 1055. 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. at 1056. 
 97.  Id.  The collateral suit technically named the National Trust as a defendant, but the court 
immediately realigned it to a plaintiff.  Id. at 1056–57. 
 98.  Id. at 1057. 
 99.  See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118(d) (West 2013) (“[A conservation easement] 
may be extinguished or released, in whole or in part, in the same manner as other easements.”). 
 100.  McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1057. 
 101.  Id. at 1059. 
 102.  Id. at 1062. 
 103.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 693. 
  
2014] PRESERVING PRESERVATION 997 
reached the opposite conclusion of the parties in Myrtle Grove,
104
 determin-
ing that the conservation easement in question did not create a charitable 
trust.
105
  Robert and Carol Prigel own and operate Bellevale Farms, an or-
ganic dairy farm, on 199 acres in Baltimore County, Maryland.
106
  In 1997, 
the Prigels sold an agricultural easement on Bellevale Farms to the Mary-
land Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (“MALPF”) for 
$796,500.
107
  The MALPF is a state agency within the Maryland Depart-
ment of Agriculture with the purpose of “promot[ing] the continued availa-
bility of agricultural supplies and markets for agricultural goods.”108  The 
easement stated that Bellevale Farms “shall be preserved solely for agricul-
tural use,” a restriction that would be in effect in perpetuity, “or for so long 
as profitable farming is feasible on [the property].”109  The easement re-
served the Prigels’ right “to use the . . . land for any farm use, and to carry 
on all normal farming practices,” including the right to process, store, and 
sell agricultural products produced on the property.
110
  The easement further 
granted the Prigels the right to submit future building requests to MALPF 
for approval as well as MALPF’s right to enter the property to monitor it 
for compliance, but stated that the easement did not grant the public the 
right to access or use the farm.
111
 
In 2007, the Prigels submitted a request to MALPF to construct a 
10,000 square foot creamery, with associated retail space and parking lot, in 
order to process raw milk into dairy products.
112
  The MALPF approved the 
proposal, noting that the operation was a “farm related use” under the terms 
of the easement.
113
  Both John and Susan Yoder, who own property adja-
cent to Bellevale Farms, and Long Green Valley Association (“LGVA”), a 
community association, opposed the creamery.
114
  The Yoders and LGVA 
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against the Pri-
gels, Bellevale Farms, and MALPF.
115
  The Circuit Court concluded that 
LGVA and the Yoders lacked standing and suggested that they had a reme-
                                                          
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 324, 68 A.3d 843, 862 
(2013).  
 106.  Id. at 296, 68 A.3d at 845. 
 107.  Id. at 300, 68 A.3d at 846–47. 
 108.  Id. at 297–98, 68 A.3d at 845–46. 
 109.  Id. at 300–02, 68 A.3d at 847–48. 
 110.  Id. at 301, 68 A.3d at 848. 
 111.  Id. at 302, 68 A.3d at 848. 
 112.  Id. at 302–303, 68 A.3d at 849. 
 113.  Id. at 303, 68 A.3d at 849. 
 114.  Id. at 303–08, 68 A.3d at 849–52.  The LGVA and the Yoders first contested the decision 
to the Deputy Zoning Commissioner, who determined that the creamery plan was consistent with 
farm use.  Id. at 303–04, 68 A.3d at 849–50. 
 115.  Id. at 305, 68 A.3d at 850. 
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dy only through the zoning, planning, and permit process.
116
  The Yoders 
and LGVA appealed the case to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, ar-
guing that they had standing on three possible grounds: as intended third-
party beneficiaries of the easement, as aggrieved parties suffering a special 
harm, or as “interested person[s]” under the Maryland charitable trust stat-
ute
117—thereby asserting that the easement created a charitable trust.118 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that LGVA and the 
Yoders did not have standing as intended beneficiaries of the easement.
119
  
The court held, however, that as adjacent landowners, the Yoders had stand-
ing under a theory of special harm.
120
  The court then considered whether 
the easement created a charitable trust such that “any interested person” 
would have standing to enforce its restrictions.
121
  Reasoning that although 
a contract may create a trust without using the word “trust” specifically, the 
court found that the easement stated only that the land was preserved solely 
for agricultural use, thereby failing to manifest a charitable purpose.
122
  Fur-
thermore, the court held that charitable trust doctrine should not apply in 
this case because the easement was potentially non-perpetual, permitting 
termination in the event that farming ceased to be profitable.
123
  Lastly, the 
court reasoned that because the Prigels were paid consideration, the transac-
tion was primarily for their benefit, with only incidental benefits to the pub-
lic.
124
  In sum, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Yoders and 
LGVA lacked standing under a charitable trust theory because the easement 
failed to manifest charitable purpose or intent.
125
  Furthermore, the court 
                                                          
 116.  Yoder v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 8-5467, 2009 WL 6560543, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
March 19, 2009). 
 117.  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-302 (West 2013) (“[A] court of equity, on applica-
tion of any trustee, or any interested person, or the Attorney General of the State, may order an 
administration of the trust, devise or bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill the general charitable 
intention of the settlor or testator.” (emphasis added)). 
 118.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 652–53, 46 A.3d 
473, 483 (2012), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013).  
 119.  Long Green Valley Ass’n, 205 Md. App. at 656–57, 46 A.3d at 485–86. 
 120.  Id. at 688–89, 46 A.3d at 504–05.  Special harm is a cause of action by which a landown-
er may petition for judicial review of a government decision affecting land use of a nearby proper-
ty.  See, e.g., Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 99, 59 A.3d 545, 560 (2013) (denying special 
harm standing to plaintiffs who lived more than one thousand feet from the development in ques-
tion). 
 121.  Long Green Valley Ass’n, 205 Md. App. at 659, 46 A.3d at 487. 
 122.  Id. at 673, 683, 46 A.3d at 495, 501. 
 123.  Id. at 676–77, 46 A.3d at 497–98.  The court noted that due to the “flexibility built into 
the document,” it was unnecessary to apply charitable trust doctrine “to react to a change of cir-
cumstances.”  Id. at 677, 46 A.3d at 498. 
 124.  Id. at 683, 46 A.3d at 501. 
 125.  Id. 
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found the easement was non-perpetual and thus did not require charitable 
trust doctrine to account for changed circumstances.
126
 
On LGVA and the Yoders’ appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, concluding that the 
purchased agricultural easement did not create a charitable trust, and there-
fore LGVA and the Yoders did not have standing to seek judicial enforce-
ment of the easement.
127
  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the easement 
did not evidence the Prigels’ intent to benefit others, a key requirement of 
charitable trust creation.
128
  The court found that the easement’s language 
limited the individuals entitled to preserve the land for agricultural use, and 
thus benefit from that use, to the Prigels and MALPF.
129
 
After determining that the easement lacked intent to create a charitable 
trust, the Court of Appeals considered whether the easement’s purpose was 
charitable.
130
  As LGVA and the Yoders argued, if the easement’s intent 
was to further MALPF’s objectives, and these objectives were charitable, 
then the easement could create a charitable trust.
131
  While LGVA and the 
Yoders contended that MALPF’s purpose was charitable because of the 
public benefit of rural land preservation,
132
 the court found that MALPF did 
not qualify as a charity because its primary purpose is to maintain agricul-
ture as a profitable enterprise.
133
  Although the court acknowledged that 
“public benefits potentially and incidentally flow” from MALPF’s agricul-
tural easement program, the court noted that the easement makes no men-
tion of conserving rural land and, instead, focuses only on “profitable farm-
ing and sale of farm products,” which the court found insufficiently 
charitable.
134
  The court therefore concluded that because neither the lan-
guage of the easement nor the statutory scheme of MALPF indicated chari-
table intent and purpose, the easement did not create a charitable trust.
135
  
                                                          
 126.  Id., 46 A.3d at 502. 
 127.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 324, 68 A.3d 843, 862 
(2013).  Charitable trust was the only theory of standing brought to the Court of Appeals.  Id. at 
307, 68 A.3d at 851 n.22. 
 128.  Id. at 318–19, 68 A.3d at 858–59. 
 129.  Id. at 319–20, 68 A.3d at 859.  In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the fact 
that the easement: precludes parties other from MALPF from enforcing the easement; does not 
grant public access; and allows only MALPF to consider a proposed use of the property.  Id. at 
320, 68 A.3d at 859. 
 130.  Id. at 320–21, 68 A.3d at 859–60. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 321, 68 A.3d at 860. 
 134.  Id. at 322–24, 68 A.3d at 861–62.  
 135.  Id. at 324, 68 A.3d at 862. 
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Without a charitable trust, LGVA and the Yoders had no standing to seek 
judicial enforcement of the easement as interested persons.
136
 
The Maryland Attorney General was thus in a difficult position of dis-
tinguishing Myrtle Grove, where, as the overseer of charitable trusts, it ar-
gued for the existence of a charitable trust,
137
 from LGVA, where it argued 
against the existence of a charitable trust in its defense of a state agency.
138
  
The Attorney General distinguished the cases on several grounds.
139
  First, 
it argued that the Myrtle Grove easement was donated as a gift instead of 
being sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars as was the Prigels’ ease-
ment.
140
  The Attorney General also contended that the Myrtle Grove ease-
ment deed “expressly and clearly recited the donor’s intent” that the ease-
ment benefit the general public.
141
  The issue of perpetuity, and the Prigels’ 
easement’s potential termination in the event that profitable farming was no 
longer feasible, was also cited as a potential distinguishing factor between 
the two cases.
142
  The Court of Appeals found this analysis persuasive,
143
 
and held that the conservation easement failed to evidence the requisite 




E.  Charitable Trusts and Standing 
As the Maryland Court of Appeals in LGVA held that the conservation 
easement had not created a charitable trust, the question of whether LGVA 
and the Yoders had standing to enforce the trust as “interested persons” was 
never addressed.
145
  The enforcement of charitable trusts has generally been 
granted to the state attorney general as the representative of the public inter-
est, but a modern exception to this rule confers standing on a party who can 
demonstrate a “special interest” in the trust.146 
                                                          
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 2.  
 138.  Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319–20, 68 A.3d at 859.   
 139.  Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Respondent Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation 
Foundation, supra note 85, at 37–40. 
 140.  Id. at 39. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319 n.37, 68 A.3d at 858 n.37. 
 144.  Id. at 324, 68 A.3d at 862. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See infra Part I.E.2. 
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1.  Standing to Enforce Charitable Trusts 
Generally, standing is the litigant’s right to seek judicial enforcement 
of an issue, based on the litigant’s interest separate from that of the general 
public.
147
  Beneficiaries of a trust generally have standing to enforce trusts, 
but standing is a more difficult issue in the charitable sector, as the benefi-
ciary is the general public.
148
  Historically, the state attorney general has the 
primary responsibility for representing the public’s interest in enforcing 
charitable trusts.
149
  The modern trend, however, confers standing on the 
state attorney general as well as any “person with a special interest in the 
trust.”150  Additionally, “the fact that a party may benefit from [the trust] is 
insufficient to confer standing to bring an enforcement action.”151  The poli-
cy of limiting standing to enforce charitable trusts is rooted in the undesira-
bility of “vexatious litigation that would result from recognition of a cause 
of action by any and all of a large number of individuals who might benefit 
incidentally from the trust.”152 
2.  Application of “Special Interest” Standing 
The question of whether a litigant has a “special interest” is often at 
the crux of third-party enforcement of charitable trusts.
153
  Although a 
plaintiff’s interest need not be unique to the plaintiff in order to confer 
standing,
154
 the “special interest” exception has generally been construed 
narrowly.
155
  For example, in Forest Guardians v. Powell,
156
 conservation 
groups and schoolchildren objected to the school district’s management of 
                                                          
 147.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984) (explaining the elements of standing 
under Article III of the Constitution). 
 148.  See Forest Guardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803, 809 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (“The fact that 
an individual may benefit from a charitable trust is insufficient to confer standing to bring an en-
forcement action.”).  
 149.  See Gene Kauffman Scholarship Found., Inc. v. Payne, 183 S.W.3d 620, 626–27 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006) (examining the role of the Attorney General in charitable trust enforcement); see also 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12598 (West 2013) (“The primary responsibility for supervising charitable 
trusts in California . . . resides in the Attorney General.”). 
 150.  In re Clement Trust, 679 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151.  Forest Guardians, 24 P.3d at 809 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 
cmt. c (1959)). 
 152.  Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C. 1990) (citing RONALD CHESTER, 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 
§ 411 (2d ed. 1977)). 
 153.  See, e.g., id. (examining the relationship between the trust document and the potential 
beneficiaries’ interest). 
 154.  See Hiland v. Ives, 257 A.2d 822, 824–25 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966) (finding that plaintiffs 
were not barred from standing merely because others shared their injury). 
 155.  See Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612 (characterizing special interest standing as “[a]n exception 
to the general rule”). 
 156.  24 P.3d 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
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land held in trust.
157
  The Court of Appeals of New Mexico held, however, 
that because the public school did not benefit directly under the act creating 
the trust, the schoolchildren failed to prove they had a “special and definite 
interest in the trust or [were] entitled to receive a benefit.”158  Similarly, in 
Warren v. Board of Regents,
159
 a charitable trust had been created to fund a 
prestigious faculty position at the University of Georgia.
160
  Faculty mem-
bers, arguing that they had standing as either contributors to the trust or as 
faculty members who might be eligible for the position, alleged the univer-
sity breached its fiduciary duty by selecting an unqualified candidate to re-
ceive the position.
161
  The Court of Appeals of Georgia found that the trust 
agreement did not “identify either plaintiff, by name, position, or associa-
tion, as a member of a class of potential beneficiaries entitled to a prefer-
ence,” and dismissed the case for a lack of standing.162 
Some courts, however, have recognized a plaintiff’s standing under a 
“special interest” theory, generally based on a specific designation in the 
trust instrument.
163
  In Hooker v. Edes Home,
164
 for example, a woman es-
tablished in her will a free home for elderly, impoverished widows in the 
Georgetown area of Washington, D.C.
165
  Eighty years later, four elderly 
unmarried women challenged the home’s proposed closing, sale, and relo-
cation.
166
  Noting that the beneficiaries of the trust were designated by cate-
gory, the Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals granted standing, holding that 
the plaintiffs met the requirements set forth in the will and had a special in-
terest distinct from the interest of the general public.
167
  The principle of 
special interest standing was also affirmed in Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp 
Foundation,
168
 where a corporate donor established a trust to benefit em-
ployees of his company and successor companies.
169
  When the foundation 
proposed to dissolve and transfer its funds to another foundation, an alleged 
                                                          
 157.  Id. at 803–04. 
 158.  Id. at 809. 
 159.  544 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
 160.  Id. at 191. 
 161.  Id. at 191–93. 
 162.  Id. at 193–94. 
 163.  See, e.g., YMCA of Washington v. Covington, 484 A.2d 589, 591 (D.C. 1984) (“Persons 
who have a special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust may maintain a suit for the 
trust’s enforcement.”). 
 164.  579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990). 
 165.  Id. at 608. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 609.  Similarly, in YMCA of Washington v. Covington, members of a branch of a 
YMCA had standing to contest the branch’s closing because “[t]he closing of that building injures 
them in particular.” 484 A.2d at 591–92. 
 168.  479 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1985). 
 169.  Id. at 755–56. 
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“successor corporation” and its employees sued.170  The Court of Appeals 
of New York found the plaintiffs had standing as specially interested parties 
because they were a part of “a class of beneficiaries which is both well de-
fined and entitled to a preference in the distribution of defendant’s 
funds.”171 
Some courts have embraced an even broader view of standing to en-
force charitable trusts.  In Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City and 
County of Honolulu,
172
 the City of Honolulu proposed to lease parkland to a 
developer to build a restaurant.
173
  The plaintiff, a Hawaii nonprofit corpo-
ration with members who lived close to and used the park, sued the city to 
prevent the misappropriation of the charitable trust property.
174
  The Su-
preme Court of Hawaii held that where the attorney general elected to sup-
port the alleged breach by siding with the city, “the citizens of this State 
would be left without protection, or a remedy, unless we hold, as we do, 
that members of the public, as beneficiaries of the trust, have standing to 
bring the matter to the attention of the court.”175  Notwithstanding this 




3.  Special Interest Standing and Conservation Easements: Hicks v. 
Dowd 
The question of “special interest” standing to enforce a charitable trust 
was applied in the conservation easement context in Hicks v. Dowd,
177
 
where the Lowham family donated a conservation easement on their 1,043-
acre Wyoming ranch to the Scenic Preserve Trust.
178
  In 2001, the company 
owning the mineral interests underlying the ranch contemplated coalbed 
methane development.
179
  The successor landowners, the Dowds, requested 
that the board terminate the easement on the grounds that coal development 
                                                          
 170.  Id. at 752, 758. 
 171.  Id. at 755. 
 172.  751 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 1988). 
 173.  Id. at 1024. 
 174.  Id.  The Hawaii Attorney General, despite raising doubts as to whether the transaction 
was consistent with the trust purpose, chose to support the city.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 1025.  A New Jersey court espoused a similar policy in City of Paterson v. Pater-
son General Hospital, where the court noted that the “manifold duties” of the Attorney General 
made it understandable that supervision of charitable trusts is “necessarily sporadic.”  235 A.2d 
487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).  The court proposed that a liberal rule as to standing 
“seems decidedly in the public interest.”  Id.  
 176.  Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., 91 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
 177.  157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007). 
 178.  Id. at 915–16.  The easement was in perpetuity unless “unforeseeable circumstances” 
made continuing the easement impossible.  Id. at 916. 
 179.  Id. at 917. 
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made the easement impossible to fulfill; the Board of the Scenic Preserve 
Trust agreed, adopting a resolution to extinguish the easement.
180
 
The plaintiff, a resident and landowner in the county where the ranch 
was located, sued to enforce the easement.
181
  The trial court concluded that 
the conservation easement had created a charitable trust, a point the Dowds 
did not challenge on appeal.
182
  The issue before the Wyoming Supreme 
Court was whether the plaintiff had the requisite “special interest” required 
to confer standing.
183
  The court distinguished between “beneficiaries” of an 
easement and “qualified beneficiaries,” concluding that while the plaintiff 
may have benefitted from the easement, his interest was shared by other 
members of the public.
184
  Therefore, the court dismissed the case for lack 
of standing.
185
  As Hicks demonstrates, even if the question of charitable 
trust formation is settled, the question of standing can greatly influence the 
easement’s enforcement.186 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Courts have not yet agreed on whether conservation easements give 
rise to charitable trusts, and if so, who has standing to enforce these ease-
ments.
187
  In an area with little direct precedent, courts are in need of guid-
ance for considering this question, which will become more prevalent as 
land preserved in the 1980s begins to change ownership and subsequent 
landowners challenge the easement restrictions.
188
  This Comment argues 
that charitable trust doctrine should be applied to conservation easements to 
bolster the easements’ restrictions in perpetuity.189  Since landowner intent 
is the benchmark of whether an easement creates a charitable trust, courts 
should determine intent by considering the objective circumstances sur-
                                                          
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. at 916–17.  
 182.  Id. at 919. 
 183.  Id. at 919–20. 
 184.  Id. at 921.  The court defined the term “‘qualified beneficiary’ as analogous to the com-
mon law concept of ‘special interest.’”  Id.  
 185.  Id.  After the case was dismissed, the attorney general filed suit to enforce the easement; 
and the case settled, with the parties agreeing that the easement was to remain in full effect.  Salz-
burg v. Dowd Settlement Upholds Easement’s Permanence, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/conservation-defense/conservation-defense-
news/salzburg-v.-dowd-settlement-upholds-easement2019s (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 186.  Hicks, 157 P.3d at 920–21.  
 187.  See supra Part I.C–E. 
 188.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 676–77; see also Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing 
that the “growth of land protected by private land trusts . . . makes it likely that the termination 
and modification of conservation easements will become a legal issue confronted increasingly by 
practitioners” in the coming years). 
 189.  See infra Part II.A. 
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rounding the easement conveyance, including the language of the easement 
deed, the benefits the landowner received, and the statutory framework of 
the easement program.
190
  To best comport with landowners’ expectations 




A.  Charitable Trust Doctrine Is Beneficial to Ensure Conservation 
Easements Remain Perpetual 
Just as courts have not agreed on whether conservation easements 
should create charitable trusts,
192
 commentators have weighed in on both 
sides of the issue.
193
  Some argue the benefits of applying charitable trust 
doctrine, noting that the promise of land preservation for future generations 
is a “key selling point” to conservation easement donors, who are given as-
surance that their easement will survive even if the grantee land trust ceases 
to exist.
194
  They note that charitable trust doctrine, through cy pres, pre-
vents modifications that may harm the conservation values without court 
approval.
195
  In the event a conservation easement is terminated for imprac-
ticability, cy pres ensures the party who owns the land at the time the ease-
ment is terminated does not receive a windfall.
196
  They also note that split-
ting legal and beneficial title ensures courts weigh the public’s interest in 
the conserved property.
197
  Additionally, where both the landowner and the 
land trust agree to modify an easement, as in Myrtle Grove and Hicks, the 
existence of a charitable trust confers standing on the state attorney general 
to ensure the easement’s terms are upheld.198 
Other commentators argue, however, that conservation easements 
should not be construed to create charitable trusts.
199
  They note that com-
                                                          
 190.  See infra Part II.B. 
 191.  See infra Part II.C. 
 192.  See supra Part I.C–D. 
 193.  Compare McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 683 (“Whenever any interest in real property, 
whether it be fee title to land or a conservation easement, is donated to a municipality or charity 
for a specific charitable purpose, both state real property law and state charitable trust law should 
apply.”), with Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 83 (“[I]ncorporating the doctrine of cy pres is an inap-
propriate response to what thus far has been so minor a problem as to be nearly theoretical.”). 
 194.  McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 676. 
 195.  See Arpad, supra note 12, at 145 (presenting the benefits of applying charitable trust 
principles in conservation easement cases). 
 196.  See id. at 147–48 (describing how a landowner who purchased the property at a price re-
flecting its limited development potential, and then sells the property without the easement’s re-
strictions, could receive an unjust gain). 
 197.  Id. at 124. 
 198.  See supra Part II.C. 
 199.  See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense and the Charitable 
Trust Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397, 398 (2009) (arguing that application of charitable trust doc-
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bining the separate doctrines creates an ill fit between property law and trust 
law and that cy pres has more potential to harm conservation interests than 
to help them.
200
  They point out that cy pres is a means to “second guess” 
land trusts, inviting more scrutiny for well-meaning land trusts that find that 
circumstances require them to modify or terminate an easement.
201
  Moreo-
ver, these commentators argue that charitable trust doctrine, and the poten-
tial expansion of standing to enforce the easement, does not comport with 
the expectation of landowners, who “would be surprised to learn that they 
have made a bargain with anyone but the organization or agency to which 
they granted the easement.”202  Cy pres, they contend, is a “sword in the 
hands of landowners and developers” and is an unnecessary pressure on 




As a general principle, charitable trust doctrine should apply to con-
servation easements.
204
  Charitable trust doctrine provides two mecha-
nisms—cy pres and attorney general standing—that ensure the land trust 
and subsequent landowners are accountable to conservation interests.
205
  
Hicks and Myrtle Grove portend a likely future for conservation easement 
                                                          
trine to conservation easements is “not well understood in the land trust community”); see also 
Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to Advance Efficiency, Free-
dom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 506 (2013) (arguing 
that charitable trusts and cy pres “may decrease the flexibility of conservation easements, subject 
the government to litigation expenses, and perhaps even replace the government holder's vision of 
the easement with the view of a third party.”). 
 200. Lindstrom, supra note 199, at 398. 
 201.  See Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 63–64 (“In considering this possible expansion of stand-
ing, it must be borne in mind that standing to enforce is, essentially, standing to ‘second guess’ the 
decisions of a land trust and landowner that result in the termination, or any modification, of a 
conservation easement”(emphasis omitted)). 
 202.  Id. at 61. 
 203.  Id. at 82.  Lindstrom contends that the scrutiny the IRS gives tax-deductible easements is 
sufficient pressure on land trusts to deter impropriety.  Id. at 78. 
 204.  See Arpad, supra note 12, at 143–49 (presenting the benefits of charitable trust doctrine 
in the conservation easement context). 
 205.  Naturally, the attorney general may not always choose to defend conservation interests, 
or it may not have the resources to involve itself in every lawsuit.  See Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc. 
v. Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Haw. 1988) (noting that the Hawaii Attorney General chose to 
support the government’s proposal to develop a portion of a public park).  As the supervisor of 
charitable trusts, however, the state attorney general is charged with representing the donor’s in-
tent.  RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411 (3d ed. 2005).  It is thus more likely than not that the attorney gen-
eral will align itself with the side defending the conservation easement’s restrictions.  See id. 
(“[T]he Attorney General . . . has been chosen as the protector, supervisor, and enforcer of chari-
table trusts.”).  But see Craig Kaufman, Sympathy for the Devil’s Advocate: Assisting the Attorney 
General When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 738 
(2006) (examining shortcomings of state attorneys general in enforcing charitable trusts and con-
cluding that standing to enforce charitable trusts should be expanded). 
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litigation—a subsequent landowner is confronted with an unforeseen diffi-
culty (in Hicks, the proposed coalbed methane mining; in Myrtle Grove, the 
financial burden of maintaining historic buildings) and successfully peti-
tions a land trust to weaken or terminate the conservation easement.
206
  
Charitable trust doctrine provides a mechanism for the donor’s intent to car-
ry forward into perpetuity regardless of the circumstances that change or the 
intentions of the subsequent landowner.
207
  The public also has a real, pecu-
niary interest in defending conservation easements—over time, U.S. tax-
payers have subsidized a considerable income tax deduction for conserva-
tion easement donations
208
 as well as funded direct purchases of 
conservation easements.
209
  Applying charitable trust doctrine represents the 
interest of the public, as well as the donor, in an existing framework under-
stood by the courts.
210
 
B.  In Considering Whether a Particular Conservation Easement 
Creates a Charitable Trust, Courts Should Consider Concrete, 
Objective Evidence of the Landowner’s Intent at the Time of the 
Easement Conveyance 
Settlor intent is the “guiding light” of trust creation211—in order for a 
conservation easement to create a charitable trust, the settlor must evidence 
his intent to create a trust, as courts will not find a trust exists where the 
grantor did not intend to create one.
212
  The easement document, however, 
need not say “trust” explicitly, as long as the easement document contains 
                                                          
 206.  See supra Parts I.D, I.E.3. 
 207.  See McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1059 (explaining the argument in the Myrtle Grove 
case that the charitable trust and cy pres framework limiting easement modification protects the 
intent of the donor).  
 208.  See I.R.C. § 170(h) (2013) (defining a “qualified conservation contribution” for income 
tax deductions); see also Ann Taylor Schwing, Perpetuity Is Forever, Almost Always: Why It Is 
Wrong to Promote Amendment and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 239 (2013) (“Taxpayers also have a strong interest in the perpetuity of con-
servation easements that they have subsidized through income tax deductions enjoyed by donors.  
Easements represent a significant segment of charitable gifts in total dollars even though donated 
by comparatively few taxpayers, so all taxpayers bear a financial burden in the creation of ease-
ments.”). 
 209.  See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 680, 46 A.3d 
473, 500 (2012) (noting that in 2003, MALPF received 17.05% of Maryland’s real estate transfer 
taxes and two-thirds of its agricultural transfer taxes to fund easement purchases), aff’d, 432 Md. 
292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013). 
 210.  See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 649–50 (1819) (adopting 
common law charitable trust principles under the Constitution’s contract clause). 
 211.  Kaufman, supra note 205, at 712. 
 212.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 351 (1959) (“A charitable trust is created on-
ly if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a charitable trust.”). 
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the essentials of a trust.
213
  Because the law does not require the easement 
document to contain any “magic words,” courts are left to divine landowner 
intent through a variety of means.
214
 
1.  The Language of the Conservation Easement Document 
Long-established rules of contract interpretation give primary signifi-
cance to an easement document in determining grantor intent.
215
  If a con-
servation easement is clear on its face regarding landowner intent, then no 
extrinsic evidence may be admitted.
216
  The clearest example of this kind of 
intent language is seen in Myrtle Grove, wherein the landowners stated that 
the easement aimed to preserve the “historic, architectural, cultural, and 
scenic values . . . for the continuing benefit of the people of the State of 
Maryland and the United States of America.”217  This type of language 
demonstrates general charitable intent, and although it does not say “trust” 
explicitly, it adequately describes the principle of a charitable trust.  The 
LGVA court pointed to the lack of this type of donative language, as well as 
provisions limiting the parties with rights to enforce the easement, and con-
cluded that the easement lacked evidence that the Prigels intended for 
MALPF to manage the property for the benefit of others, a required element 
of a charitable trust.
218
 
While “public benefit” language such as that in Myrtle Grove may aid 
a court in divining landowner intent,
219
 it is far from the exclusive means of 
determining whether a conservation easement evinces charitable intent. 
Most conservation easements are negotiated from the starting point of the 
land trust’s model easement.220  While a landowner has power to negotiate 
the terms of the easement, she is more likely to negotiate terms related to 
the physical management of the property, such as development and subdivi-
sion, than a “boilerplate” term such as the “for the benefit of the people” 
term in Myrtle Grove.
221
  Perhaps more compelling evidence of the land-
                                                          
 213.  See id. § 24 (“No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifestation 
of intention to create a trust.”).  
 214.  Id.  
 215.  See Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003) (“In construing 
the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply.  The grant of an ease-
ment by deed is strictly construed.”). 
 216.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 314, 68 A.3d 843, 856 
(2013). 
 217.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 83, at 3 (emphasis omitted).   
 218.  Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 320, 68 A.3d at 859.  
 219.  McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1043–58. 
 220.  See, e.g., Model Grants of Conservation Easement, PA. LAND TRUST ASS’N, 
http://conserveland.org/modelconservationeasements (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (presenting dif-
ferent easement templates used by the Pennsylvania Land Trust Association). 
 221.  McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1043. 
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owner’s intent lies in the other terms the LGVA court focused on, namely, 
who had access and enforcement rights, as this is something the landowner 
likely paid close attention to in the easement negotiation process.
222
  While 
the donative language of the deed plays an essential role in divining land-
owner intent, it is not the exclusive means at the court’s disposal to deter-
mine whether an easement document manifests charitable intent. 
2.  Consideration 
In conveying a conservation easement, a landowner may be paid di-
rectly,
223
 or he may donate the easement for no consideration.
224
  No bright-
line rule exists for determining whether the payment of consideration pre-
cludes the creation of a charitable trust.  Some commentators have conclud-
ed that the payment of consideration defeats charitable intent, arguing that a 
transaction that results in private benefit, by its very nature, cannot be chari-
table.
225
  This view was adopted in Three Bills, Inc. v. City of Parma,
226
 
where an Ohio court concluded that a developer who was required to deed a 
portion of the subdivision land to the city for a park was paid “valid consid-
eration,” and therefore the developer had made no “dedication” required for 
a charitable trust.
227
  Other courts and commentators contend that a charita-
ble trust may exist even if the grantor was compensated, often emphasizing 
the benefit to the public irrespective of the nature of the transaction.
228
  A 
Massachusetts court expressed this view in Cohen v. City of Lynn,
229
 where 
the court concluded that a property sold to a municipality “forever for park 
purposes” created a charitable trust, as a charitable trust may be supported 
by consideration when a potential beneficiary “confers a benefit on the set-
tlor” to induce him to create the trust.230 
                                                          
 222.  See Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 319, 68 A.3d at 859 (concluding the easement 
did not evidence intent to create a charitable trust because only MALPF had the right to access the 
property and enforce the easement).  
 223.  See, e.g., id. at 300, 68 A.3d at 847 (indicating the landowners were paid $796,500 for 
the easement conveyance). 
 224.  See, e.g., Huber v. Kenna, 205 P.3d 1158, 1159 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (indicating the 
landowners donated a conservation easement and recouped tax credits). 
 225.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959) (“A trust is not a charitable trust 
if the property or the income therefrom is to be devoted to a private use.”). 
 226.  676 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 227.  Id. at 1275. 
 228.  See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 702 (arguing that “members of the public as well as 
prospective easement grantors are unlikely to think that the method of acquisition should be rele-
vant to the question of whether the easement should continue to be enforced”). 
 229.  598 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
 230.  Id. at 684–85 (quoting RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE 
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 202 (2d ed. 1992)). 
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The case law is unclear on the role of consideration in charitable trust 
creation.  On one hand, the fact that the landowner received a substantial 
benefit may undermine his charitable intent; on the other hand, the public is 
unlikely to care about the mode of easement acquisition in its expectation 
that the easement be upheld.
231
  The intermediate appellate court in LGVA 
reasoned that because the Prigels were paid a substantial amount and per-
mitted to continue profitable farming, the easement was “obviously benefi-
cial” to the Prigels; and from the court’s viewpoint, “any benefit to the pub-
lic was incidental.”232 
As a practical matter, all landowners who convey conservation ease-
ments are likely to see significant financial benefit, through direct payment, 
an income tax deduction, or both.
233
  Although donated easements often ex-
plicitly take into account the public’s interest,234 the tax deduction for 
easement donations makes it potentially very lucrative for wealthy land-
owners to donate an easement.
235
  The distinction between donated and pur-
chased easements may thus be specious as evidence of landowners’ intent.  
Private land conservation transactions do not cleave neatly into landowners 
encumbering their land for their own benefit and landowners conveying 
easements for the good of society.  Moreover, the public benefits regardless 
                                                          
 231.  Compare Three Bills, Inc., 676 N.E.2d at 1275 (finding payment of consideration pre-
cluded creation of a charitable trust), with Cohen, 598 N.E.2d at 685 (finding a charitable trust in 
spite of payment of consideration). 
 232.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 683, 46 A.3d 473, 
501 (2012), aff’d, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013). 
 233.  See The Enhanced Easement Incentive, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/the-enhanced-easement-incentive 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (crediting the enhanced tax incentive with increasing the pace of land 
conservation by one-third nationwide).  Although compensation of the full fair market value of a 
conservation easement will always be more lucrative to the landowner than a tax deduction for the 
same value, many easement programs lack funds to pay full market value for conservation ease-
ments.  See Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 298–99, 68 A.3d 
843, 846 (2013) (noting that MALPF’s easement purchase program is “quite competitive” and 
many landowners accept discounted payments for easements).  Some wealthy landowners may in 
fact prefer the tax write-off from a donated easement, especially with generous carry-over provi-
sions that were in place through 2013.  See Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2012-001, 5 
(2012)  (noting amounts of charitable tax deductions, as indicated on the landowners’ tax returns).  
Relying on the tax deduction as proof of intent brings up an evidentiary issue, however, as the 
purchase price of an easement is likely to be on the face of the easement deed, while the quantity 
of a charitable tax deduction is found only in extrinsic evidence. Id.  
 234.  See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (2013) (outlining the means by which a donated easement may 
benefit the public, including outdoor recreation, scenic enjoyment, or historic preservation). 
 235.  See Tax Incentive for Conservation Easements, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/campaigns/how-you-can-help (last visited Jan. 
5, 2014) (noting that the enhanced easement tax incentive allowed some qualified farmers and 
ranchers to deduct one hundred percent of their annual gross income with a sixteen-year carry-
over).   
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of whether the easement was purchased or donated.
236
  The payment of con-
sideration should create a presumption against a charitable trust, but the 
presumption may be rebutted with other evidence of intent.
237
 
3.  Statutory Framework 
Another possible metric of landowner intent is the overarching pur-
pose of the grantee land trust.  In the case of a government land trust, its 
purpose is found in the enabling statutory framework; in the case of a non-
profit land trust, the purpose is found in its charitable mission.  The LGVA 
court put this issue at the center of its analysis, finding that MALPF’s pur-
pose was not to benefit the public but rather to promote profitable farm-
ing.
238
  LGVA distinguished between MALPF’s statutory scheme and a 
scheme for the “charitable preservation of land for public use and enjoy-
ment.”239  Considering the purpose of the easement program can be a help-
ful means of divining landowner intent for two reasons.  First, landowners 
may have several options of easement programs from which to choose, and 
thus the nature of the grantee land trust can demonstrate the purpose they 
intended in conserving their land.
240
  Second, the grantee’s purpose is likely 
stated on the face of the easement document itself, thereby comporting with 
the evidentiary requirements of deed interpretation.
241
 
The Prigels entrusted MALPF to monitor their easement in perpetui-
ty,
242
 a leap of faith they would be unlikely to take without the intent to 
support MALPF’s mission.  In light of the historically broad view of what 
constitutes charity, which includes “substantially any scheme or effort to 
better the condition of society or any considerable part thereof,”243 the 
MALPF easement in question in LGVA likely met the test for a charitable 
                                                          
 236.  See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 702 (positing that the public expects easements to be 
enforced, regardless of how they were acquired). 
 237.  See Arpad, supra note 12, at 138–39 (“Receiving consideration is certainly no bar to 
forming a charitable trust, but the existence of consideration may make a court less likely to find 
an implied charitable trust to protect the intentions of the grantor.” (footnote omitted)).  
 238.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 322–23, 68 A.3d 843, 
861 (2013). 
 239.  Id. at 322, 68 A.3d at 861. 
 240.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2–501(a)(1) (West 2013) (stating that the purpose 
of the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation is to “[p]rovide sources of agricultural 
products within the State for the citizens of the State”), with MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 3–201 
(West 2013) (providing that the purpose of the Maryland Environmental Trust, a different state-
affiliated land trust that accepts conservation easements, is “to conserve, improve, stimulate, and 
perpetuate the aesthetic, natural, health and welfare, scenic, and cultural qualities of the environ-
ment”). 
 241.  See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n, 432 Md. at 314, 68 A.3d at 855–56 (examining the 
rules of construction in the context of deed interpretation). 
 242.  Id. at 302, 68 A.3d 848.  
 243.  Wilson v. First Nat’l Bank, 145 N.W. 948, 952 (Iowa 1914).  
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purpose.
244
  Under this broad definition of “charitable,” it is difficult to see 
how MALPF’s aims to preserve farmland and to maintain agriculture as a 
profitable enterprise are not charitable.  The fact that the means of imple-
menting this scheme involve payments to private landowners does not indi-
cate the purpose of the easement program is not charitable.  Moreover, the 
public, through allocation of a portion of its real estate transfer taxes, has 
subsidized these easement payments, presumably through a shared view of 
the desirability of undeveloped farmland and a viable agricultural econo-
my.
245
  By choosing to convey an easement to an entity with a public pur-
pose, the Prigels objectively demonstrated charitable intent. 
Viewing conservation easements as charitable trusts, rather than mere-
ly private contracts between the landowner and the land trust, carries signif-
icant benefits for ensuring the perpetuity of land conservation.  Applying 
charitable trust doctrine accords with landowners’ expectation that the re-
strictions will be enforced in perpetuity and represents the public’s interest 
in upholding the easement restrictions.  In order to best divine the landown-
er intent required to create a charitable trust, courts should consider objec-
tive, practical evidence such as the easement terms, consideration paid, and 
the purpose of the grantee organization. 
C.  In Order to Comport with Landowners’ Expectations, Courts 
Should Construe Narrowly the “Special Interest” Allowance for 
Third-Party Standing 
In the charitable sector, many commentators have observed the mod-
ern trend of expanded standing, a departure from the traditional rule that on-
ly the state attorney general has the right to enforce charitable trusts.
246
  The 
expansion of standing relies on solid policy grounds, as attorneys general 
are often pressed for resources or subject to political pressure, leaving many 
trusts without oversight.
247
  Many commentators, however, have advocated 
                                                          
 244.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959) (including “governmental or mu-
nicipal purposes” as well as “other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the 
community” among the purposes that qualify as “charitable”).  The generality of permissible char-
itable uses is based on the oft-cited Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.  Id. at 
cmt. a. 
 245.  See Brief of Appellants at 16, Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 
Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013) (No. 65) (“[F]ew programs are so completely infused with a public 
purpose and function, are so dedicated expressly to benefiting and protecting the public, and are so 
specifically tailored to provide these public benefits with the cooperation and support of the public 
itself [as MALPF is].”). 
 246.  See CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414 (“If Attorney General en-
forcement remains lax, the number of specially interested beneficiaries granted standing to sue can 
be expected to increase.”). 
 247.  See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 205, at 726–28 (detailing the potential problems of attor-
ney general oversight).   
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a narrow view of “special interest” standing, noting the potential for “fre-
quent, ill-considered suits leading to unnecessary litigation.”248 
1. The Need for Narrow Construction of “Special Interest” 
Standing in Conservation Easements 
Although charitable trusts are often thought to be a benign way to en-
sure future enforcement of conservation easements,
249
 LGVA represents the 
potential downside of liberal standing in charitable trust enforcement.  The 
interests of the easement donor and the party seeking standing may be op-
posed.
250
  Myrtle Grove may represent the ideal scenario for the use of char-
itable trust doctrine—a subsequent landowner attempting to unencumber 
the land for pecuniary gain.
251
  LGVA, however, represents a stickier scenar-
io—neighbors who arguably qualify as “special interest” holders,252 suing 
to enforce the easement during the ownership of the original easement sell-
er.  LGVA demonstrates the potential danger of burdensome litigation re-
sulting from applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements.
253
 
While the expansion of standing to enforce charitable trusts may have 
general benefits in strengthening enforcement, conservation easements’ root 
in property law differentiate them from other charitable transactions.
254
  Un-
like, for example, the cases of a university faculty position
255
 or a home for 
elderly widows,
256
 adjacent landowners such as the Yoders have an existing 
property interest and a host of legal remedies outside the trust context.
257
  
                                                          
 248.  CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414. 
 249.  See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 712 (advocating for application of charitable trust prin-
ciples to conservation easements to “ensure that the public interest and considerable investment in 
perpetual conservation easements is appropriately protected”). 
 250.  Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 296, 68 A.3d 843, 845 
(2013); see also Lindstrom, supra note 5, at 66–67 (noting the disadvantages of expanded stand-
ing by applying charitable trust doctrine to conservation easements). 
 251.  See McLaughlin, supra note 83, at 1045–50 (detailing the developer’s attempt to amend 
the Myrtle Grove conservation easement to permit further development). 
 252.  See Grabowski v. City of Bristol, 780 A.2d 953, 955 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (finding a 
landowner adjacent to a public park had standing to sue in the absence of the attorney general’s 
participation). 
 253.  See CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 205, § 414 (“The courts usually require 
that suits for enforcement be brought by the established representative of the charity, the Attorney 
General, so that the trustees may not be vexed by frequent, ill-considered suits leading to unneces-
sary litigation.”). 
 254.  See Arpad, supra note 12, at 109 (examining the nature of the property right conveyed in 
a conservation easement). 
 255.  Warren v. Bd. Of Regents, 544 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
 256.  Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990). 
 257.  See, e.g., Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 85, 59 A.3d 545, 551 (2013) (noting that in 
a zoning appeal case, a landowner is “prima facie aggrieved when his proximity makes him an 
adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner”). 
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As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted, the Yoders were prima 
facie aggrieved as adjacent landowners under a theory of special harm, and 
could have demonstrated facts of the creamery’s negative impact on re-
mand.
258
  A cause of action for special harm confers standing on a land-
owner “whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by” a gov-
ernmental land use decision and, thus, provides a more general cause of 
action to object to land use decisions that affect one’s property.259  If the 
goal of expanding standing is to guarantee a day in court for those who ob-
ject to the management of a trust, in the conservation easement context 
“special interest” standing may be duplicative and merely another tool in 
the arsenal of disgruntled neighbors.
260
 
2. A Proposed Balancing Test to Evaluate Special Interest Standing 
In order to balance the competing interests of ensuring future enforce-
ment of charitable trusts and deterring excessive litigation, courts should 
adopt a balancing test to evaluate “special interest” standing.261  The factors, 
as proposed by Professors Blasko, Crossley, and Lloyd, are: (1) the extraor-
dinary nature of the acts alleged; (2) the presence of bad faith; (3) the avail-
ability of the attorney general; and (4) the nature of the benefitted class.
262
  
This test was applied to assess third-party standing in the case of Schalken-
bach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation.
263
  In that case, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals found the plaintiffs did not have standing because there was no 
“sharply defined” class to which the plaintiffs belonged, the actions alleged 
(improperly transferring funds to organizations that did not follow the 
trust’s distinct purpose) were not sufficiently extraordinary, and the attor-
ney general’s lack of involvement was not due to a neglect of the public in-
terest.
264
  Applying similar factors to arrive at an opposite conclusion, the 
New York case of Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Foundation
265
 found that the 
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proposed dissolution of the charity was sufficiently drastic and the benefit-
ted class sufficiently defined to confer standing.
266
 
3.  Using a Balancing Test to Assess Special Interest Standing in 
LGVA 
The balancing test thus provides an administrable framework for 
courts to consider whether a particular third-party plaintiff has standing to 
enforce a charitable trust.  In applying the balancing test to LGVA, it is like-
ly that even if the Maryland Court of Appeals had determined a charitable 
trust had been created, the Yoders and LGVA would not have had standing.  
The first factor is perhaps the most determinative—the act of constructing a 
10,000-foot creamery on a 199-acre property,
267
 in accordance with a con-
servation easement term allowing structures associated with the sale of ag-
ricultural goods, is simply not as egregious as the acts alleged in many char-
itable trust cases.
268
  The LGVA court was arguably influenced by the rela-
relative mildness of the allegations; one can imagine that if the facts had 
mirrored Myrtle Grove’s proposed subdivision or Hicks’s proposed coalbed 
methane development, the court would have been more inclined to expand 
standing. 
Regarding the second factor of fraud or bad faith, the Yoders and 
LGVA did not allege that the creamery was proposed in bad faith, weaken-
ing their argument for standing.
269
  Turning to the third factor of attorney 
general involvement, in LGVA the attorney general was an integral part of 
the case, albeit in its capacity defending the state agency that held the ease-
ment, not overseeing the charitable trust.
270
  In the final factor, the nature of 
the benefitted class, the Yoders’ strongest argument for standing emerges.  
While a conservation easement is unlikely to have a “sharply defined” class 
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of beneficiaries mentioned in the trust instrument,
271
 an adjacent landowner 
does indeed benefit particularly from his neighbor’s conservation easement 
and may likewise be particularly harmed by a neighbor’s decision to build a 
creamery.
 272
  These issues, however, are separate from the enforcement of a 
charitable trust and are adequately addressed in the land use context.  Had 
the LGVA court applied a balancing test such as the Blasko test,
273
 it is un-
likely that it would have conferred standing on LGVA and the Yoders. 
By interpreting “special interest” standing narrowly, courts can limit 
the litigation exposure of well-meaning landowners who grant conservation 
easements, thereby promoting the social good of land preservation.  If the 
LGVA court had treated standing as a threshold issue and reasoned that even 
if the easement had created a charitable trust, the Yoders and LGVA did not 
meet the standard for having a special interest by the balancing test de-
scribed above, it could have dismissed the case without a lengthy, complex 
debate about charitable trust doctrine.
274
  Had the Yoders and LGVA been 
successful, the litigation would have developed in three parts, at great ex-
pense to all parties: determining whether there was a charitable trust, 
whether the plaintiffs had standing as specially interested parties, and only 
then whether there was a legitimate easement violation.  The public has ex-
pressed, through subsidizing tax deductions and easement purchase pro-
grams, that land preservation is a social good.
275
  Courts should adopt a pol-
icy that encourages, rather than chills, the conveyance of conservation 
easements.  No landowner would grant an easement with the expectation of 
giving his neighbor standing to sue him for his land management deci-
sions.
276
  If landowner intent is truly the “guiding light” of charitable trust 
administration,
277
 courts should construe standing very narrowly in this are-
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na.  The more efficiently these cases are handled, the less likely they are to 
have a chilling effect on future easement donations.
278
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Land conservation in the United States is on the cusp of a defining le-
gal era.  With over 100,000 easements covering the equivalent of the area of 
South Carolina, legal challenges are inevitable as preserved land changes 
hands.
279
  To face these impending challenges, courts need an administrable 
legal framework that both carries forth the intent of landowners who con-
veyed easements and encourages future easements.
280
  Applying charitable 
trust doctrine is a positive step toward strengthening easement enforcement, 
but it must be administered in a manner that does not encourage cumber-
some, expensive litigation for landowners.
281
  Such efficient litigation can 
be accomplished by a strict construction of third-party standing, which will 
ensure landowners who previously conveyed easements are not sued unnec-
essarily, while conferring standing on those defending the easement gran-
tor’s vision of his land.282 
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